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Determination of the Effect of a Discharge
in Bankruptcy
T. A. Smedley*
This article examines the operation of the system under which the
granting of the discharge is the function of the bankruptcy court but
the construction of the effect of the discharge falls within the power
of any court in which a creditor happens to bring suit to enforce an
obligatiop of the bankrupt. The customary practice of leaving to the
lower state courts the task of determining the dischargeability of
specific debts is evaluated, and the bases for having this determination
made in the bankruptcy court instead are explored.
I. TE GENERAL DISCuARGE
The primary purposes of bankruptcy proceedings are commonly said to
be: (1) to secure an equitable distribution of the debtor's assets among
his creditors in partial payment of his debts; and (2) to release the debtor
from the burden of his obligations so that he may be given a new economic
start in life.' It is to serve this latter aim that the Bankruptcy Act authorizes
the bankruptcy courts to grant discharges to debtors who have been duly
adjudicated bankrupts.2 Under the procedure prescribed in section 14, the
court makes its determination as to whether the bankrupt is deserving of
this privilege. The act directs that "the court shall grant the discharge" un-
less it finds that the debtor has committed one or more of certain enumer-
ated wrongful acts which render him unworthy of being released from his
obligations. Seven types of such wrongdoing are listed in section 14(c).
Most frequently invoked are those which involve fraudulent conduct in
the creation of a liability and those which tend to frustrate the achievement
of a fair distribution of a debtor's assets to his creditors. Objections to the
granting of a discharge may be raised by the creditors, the trustee in bank-
ruptcy, or an attorney acting for the United States. If none of the statutory
grounds for denial is established, the court enters an order which in gen-
eral terms discharges the bankrupt "from all debts and claims which are
made provable by said [Bankruptcy] Act against his estate, except such
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Illinois and Virginia Bars.
1. Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554 (1915). See
Echelbarger v. First Nat'l Bank, 211 Ind. 199, 5 N.E.2d 966, 968 (1937).
2. Bankruptcy Act § 2(12), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 545 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § lla(12)
(1958).
3. See In re Thomas, 92 Fed. 912 (S.D. Iowa 1899).
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debts as are, by said Act, excepted from the operation of a discharge in
bankruptcy."4
When a discharge order becomes final, it binds all other courts on the
issue of whether the debtor was entitled to be released from legal liability
for the debts covered by the general terms of the discharge.5 The order,
however, being general in terms, does not determine whether any specific
debt is within its operation.6 Even though a creditor opposes the granting
of a discharge on the ground that his claim was created as a result of con-
duct by the bankrupt which serves both as a ground for denial of a dis-
charge under section 14 and as a basis for rendering the claim non-discharge-
able under section 17, the court's ruling that the conduct does not bar a
general discharge is not res judicata on the issue of the dischargeability of
the individual debt.7
Thus, the question remains as to what debts are exempt from the effect
of the discharge under section 17a. This section states that "a discharge
in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts... ,"
except those falling within the six types of obligations thereafter enumer-
ated. It is to be noted that two classes of debts are recognized as non-
dischargeable. First, debts which do not fall within the classification of
"provable" debts as set out in section 63 can not be discharged. These
include, among others, (1) unliquidated or contingent claims which are
not allowed because they are not capable of reasonable estimation,8 and
(2) most unliquidated tort claims except rights to recover damages in
actions for negligence which are pending when the bankruptcy petition is
filed.9 Second, a wide variety of debts, though provable in nature, are
made non-dischargeable by section 17a. The most significant of these are
liabilities for committing fraud while acting in a fiduciary capacity, for
obtaining money or property by false representations, and for willfully and
maliciously injuring persons and property.'(
4. BANmUPTCY FonM 45.
5. Joyner v. Bank of Menlo, 156 Ga. 750, 120 S.E. 4 (1923); First Discount Corp.
v. Applegate, 104 Ohio App. 84, 143 N.E.2d 868 (1957); 1 COLLIEM, BANKRUPTCY
8 17.27 (14th ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER).
6. COLLu § 14.02; In re Legon, 85 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
As to the power of the court to issue a limited discharge which specifies that certain
debts are not affected by it, see text accompanying notes 118-40 infra.
7. Friend v. Talcott, 228 U.S. 27 (1913). See Oglebay, Some Developrments in
Bankruptcy Law, 18 REF. J. 9, 14 (1943).
8. Bankruptcy Act §§ 57d, 63a(8), 63d. See MACLACILAN, BANIMUPTCY § 139
(1956); COLLIER § 17.27.
9. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(7), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 103(a)(7) (1958). See MAcLACHLAN, op. cit. supra note 8, § 138; 8 REmINGTON,
BAKUPTCY § 3306 (6th ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as REMUNGTONI.
10. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(2), (4), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 530 (1898), as amended, 11
U.S.C. §§ 35(a)(2), (4) (1958). Also included are liabilities for: certain taxes, § 17
a(1); alimony or separate maintenance, and damages for seduction, § 17a(2); wages
earned by employees within three months of the bankruptcy, § 17a(5); money of an
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II. DETER-MINATioN BY STATE COURTS OF THE DiscHOREABnrf OF
SPECIFIC DEBTS
Since the bankruptcy court ordinarily is called on to decide only the
issue of the debtor's right to a discharge, the question of the effect of the
discharge on any of his various liabilities is generally declared to be a
matter for decision by the court in which the creditor chooses to bring
suit on the obligation"-typicaly, the state court with jurisdiction over
the place where the debtor resides or owns property. A creditor is not
barred from attempting to enforce his cause of action in a state court merely
because he has failed to exercise his rights to oppose the granting of a
general discharge to the bankrupt,' 2 or to file his claim for payment in the
bankruptcy proceedings; 13 nor does the fact that he has participated in the
proceedings by filing his claim and receiving partial payment bar him from
subsequently suing for the unpaid balance.14 Thus, a suit by a creditor to
collect his debt after a discharge has been granted does not constitute a
collateral attack on the discharge order, 5 and the creditor does not act in
contempt of the bankruptcy court merely because he brings suit with
knowledge that a general discharge has been granted. 6
If the creditor prosecutes his action on the debt after the discharge has
been obtained, the bankrupt then has the opportunity to assert his discharge
by pleading it in defense.
The right to a discharge is one thing, and the effect of it, when granted, is another,
employee retained by the bankrupt to secure faithful performance, § 17a(6); and
debts not duly scheduled by the bankrupt, if the creditor had no notice of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings, § 17a(3).
11. Grand Union Equip. Co. v. Lippner, 167 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1948); Otte v.
Cooks, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 861 (D. Minn. 1953); Kendrix v. Superior Egg Co., 99 Ga.
App. 575, 109 S.E.2d 59 (1959); Wasylkiw v. Jendrowski, 52 N.J. Super. 243, 145
A.2d 351 (Ch. Div. 1958); COLLIER §§ 14.62, 17.28.
While the creditor's remedy usually lies in a state court, it may also be pursued in
a non-bankruptcy federal court if the proper elements of federal jurisdiction are present
in the case.
12. Personal Fin. Co. v. Hadden, 142 F.2d 896 (6th Cir. 1944); Time Fin. Co. v.
Nelson, 312 Ky. 255, 227 S.W.2d 189 (1950). See text accompanying notes 74-76
infra.
13. In re Lewensohn, 99 Fed. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1900); Wasylkiw v. Jendrowski, supra
note 11; Ohio Fin. Co. v. Greathouse, 110 N.E.2d 805 (Ohio App. 1947); Gehlen v.
Patterson, 83 N.H. 328, 141 Atl. 914 (1928). But see Friedman Fin. Co. v. Shirley,
168 Ohio St. 273, 154 N.E.2d 148 (1958). The creditor was denied enforcement of
a judgment entered summarily on a cognovit note because he had failed to file a claim
on the debt in the bankruptcy proceedings; the court noted that in the summary pro-
ceeding to obtain the judgment, the debtor bad had no opportunity to raise the defense
of discharge in bankruptcy.
14. Friend v. Talcott, supra note 7; Katzenstein v. Reid, Murdock & Co., 41 Tex.
Civ. App. 106, 91 S.W. 360 (1905).
15. First Discount Corp. v. Applegate, supra note 5; Katzenstein v. Reid, Murdock &
Co., supra note 14.
16. In re Weisberg, 253 Fed. 833 (E.D. Mich. 1918).
1961 ]
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and wholly distinct, proposition.... The issue upon the effect of a discharge will
arise when a creditor seeks to enforce a judgment or claim, and the debtor pleads
his discharge in bar thereof.... [Therefore,] the proper place and time for the
determination of the effect of the discharge is when the same is pleaded or relied
upon as a defense to the enforcement of the particular claim.17
In answer to this defense, the creditor may allege that the debt is of a
character which is not affected by the discharge, either because it was not
provable at the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed, or because it
falls within one of the specific exceptions set out in section 17a. 18 In this
manner the issue of dischargeability is properly presented to the state court
for decision.
If the claim has already been prosecuted to judgment prior to the
granting of the discharge, so that the bankrupt had no opportunity to
plead his discharge in defense, his remedy lies in following whatever
procedure the state provides for preventing enforcement of the judgment.
Typically, the remedy consists of enjoining the creditor from employing
the ordinary processes of execution, attachment, garnishment, and so on.19
But in some jurisdictions the bankrupt may resort to special statutory
proceedings, such as a motion to vacate a default judgment entered through
mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or excusable neglect,20 or an application
17. In re Rhutassel, 96 Fed. 597, 598 (N.D. Iowa 1899). See also State Fin. Co.
v. Morrow, 216 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1954); Gathany v. Bishopp, 177 F.2d 567 (4th
Cir. 1949); Matter of Siegel, 164 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1958); Jenkins v. Bishop
Apartments, Inc., 144 Conn. 389, 132 A.2d 573 (1957); REmNGTON § 3239.
If the creditor has instituted his suit before the petition in bankruptcy is filed, the
bankrupt may preserve his rights to plead his anticipated discharge in defense by
obtaining from the bankruptcy court a stay of the proceedings in the state court until
the discharge is granted. Bankruptcy Act § Ila, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 549 (1898), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. § 29 (1958). Eistrat v. Cekada, 50 Cal. 2d 289, 324 P.2d 881
(1958). See text accompanying notes 49-61 infra.
18. Though the rule may differ in the various jurisdictions, it is said that in most
states the creditor is not required to plead the non-dischargeability of his debt in order
to be allowed to prove that factor. RBmncTrox § 3241.
19. Kendrix v. Superior Egg Co., supra note 11 (to set aside garnishment and obtain
money already withheld by garnishee); Shabaz v. Henn, 48 Ga. App. 441, 173 S.E.
249 (1934) (to obtain perpetual stay of execution); Wofford Oil Co. v. Womack, 46
Ga. App. 246, 167 S.E. 331 (1933) (to obtain temporary stay of execution pending
grant of discharge); First Discount Corp. v. Applegate, supra note 5 (to plead discharge
in defense to creditor's proceeding in aid of execution); Kruegel v. Murphy & Bolanz,
59 Tex. Civ. App. 482, 126 S.W. 680 (1910) (to enjoin creditor from requiring is-
suance of execution). See CoLIER § 17.32.
20. Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Cummings, 38 N.J. Super. 1, 118 A.2d 80
(App. Div. 1955). See CAL. CODE CIV. Pnoc. § 473 (Deering 1953). This type of
remedy is especially appropriate in situations in which the creditor files suit prior to
the bankruptcy, delays for a long period, and then suddenly prosecutes the suit to
judgment. Under such circumstances, a default judgment may be obtained without
the debtor even being aware that the case is being tried. See Holmes v. Rowe, 97
F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1938) (suit filed prior to bankruptcy; default judgment obtained,
without notice to debtor, 2% years after bankruptcy); In re Innis, 140 F.2d 479 (7th
Cir. 1944) (suit filed prior to bankruptcy, default judgment obtained 4h years after
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for cancellation of record of a judgment discharged in bankruptcy 21
Several states have moved to protect the bankrupt by means of such
judgment-cancellation statutes, most of them being similar in terms to the
New York act, which provides:
At any time after one year has elapsed since a bankrupt or debtor was discharged
from his debts . .. the bankrupt or debtor . . . may apply, upon proof of the
bankrupts or debtor's discharge, to the court in which a judgment was rendered
against him . . . for an order, directing that a discharge or a qualified discharge
of record be marked upon the docket of the judgment.2=
In the pursuit of any of these types of remedies, the discharge in bank-
ruptcy is asserted as the basis for relief, and the court must determine
whether the obligation on which the judgment was rendered was discharge-
able in nature. By putting a certified copy of the discharge order in evi-
dence, the bankrupt, by virtue of section 21f of the Bankruptcy Act, estab-
lishes a prima facie defense,23 and the creditor then has the burden of
proving that the debt is in the non-dischargeable class.24 In order to sus-
tain this burden, he must prove affrmatively all of the elements making up
the offense which, under the terms of the Bankruptcy Act, causes the
obligation to be excepted from the discharge. Thus, if the creditor con-
tends that the debt is within section 17a(2) as a liability "for obtaining
money or property by false pretenses or false representations," he must
show that "the bankrupts representations were material and false in fact;
that they were made with intent to deceive and defraud or made recklessly
without knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; and that the
creditor must have believed, acted, and relied upon them to his preju-
bankruptcy and 32 years after discharge); Gathany v. Bishopp, supra note 17 (enforce-
ment of judgment more than 12 years after discharge).
21. Application of Julien, 145 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Application of Nething,
137 N.Y.S.2d 96 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd without opinion, 285 App. Div. 1023, 139
N.Y.S.2d 905 (1955). See In re Devereaux, 76 F.2d 522, 523 (2d Cir. 1935); REmV-
INTON § 3245.
22. N.Y. DEBT. & Cran. LAw § 150. For similar statutes see: CAL. CODE Civ. Pnoc.
§ 675(b) (Deering 1953); MnN. STAT. § 548.18 (1953); N.D. CENTURY CODE §
28-20-30 (1960).
23. Woerter v. David, 311 IlL. App. 595, 37 N.E.2d 448 (1941); Leeds, Inc. v.
Love, 104 Ohio App. 145, 145 N.E.2d 154 (1957); Corin= §§ 17.23, 17.31. Section
21f of the Bankruptcy Act provides: "A certified copy of any order or decree entered
in a proceeding under this Act shall be evidence of the jurisdiction of the court, the
regularity of the proceedings, the fact that the order or decree was made, and the
contents thereof .... "
24. Whelan v. United States Guarantee Co., 252 F.2d 851 (D.C. Cir. 1958); In re
Noble, 42 F. Supp. 684 (D. Colo. 1941); Morris v. Drubin, 165 Cal. App. 2d 467,
332 P.2d 371 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Accounts Supervision Co. v. Atley, 89 So. 2d
508 (La. App. 1956); Hunter v. Commercial See. Co., 237 Miss. 41, 113 So. 2d 127
(1959); Wasylkiw v. Jendrowski, supra note 11; National Fin. Co. v. Valdez, 11 Utah




dice."25 One qualification to the general rule regarding burden of proof
exists. If the creditor relies on section 17a(3)26 to except his debt from
the discharge, and proves that the bankrupt failed to schedule that debt
properly in time to permit the proof and allowance of the claim in the
bankruptcy proceedings, he is deemed to have fulfilled his burden of show-
ing his debt was not discharged. Thereupon, the bankrupt must bear the
burden of proving that the creditor is excluded from the protection of this
exception because he knew of the bankruptcy proceedings even though his
debt was not scheduled. 27
The opinions reflect some uncertainty about what evidence the court
should consider when called upon to make a determination as to the dis-
chargeability of a debt. When the discharge is raised as a defense to the
creditor's original suit on the debt, it seems clear that the court will deter-
mine the character of the obligation on the basis of whatever relevant evi-
dence, admissible under general rules of law, the parties offer to show that
the obligation is within or without the operation of the discharge. And if
the suit is brought on a note given by the bankrupt to evidence an obliga-
tion in other form, the creditor may prove that the original obligation was
non-dischargeable in order to refute the bankrupts contention that the
obligation on the note was discharged as a simple contract debt.P When
the discharge is asserted to bar enforcement of a judgment already ob-
tained by the creditor or to secure a cancellation of such judgment, the
decisions as to what evidence should be considered are in confusion, and
probably in conflict. If the judgment itself determined, or if the entire
record of the suit in which the judgment was obtained conclusively demon-
strated, that the debt was either dischargeable or non-dischargeable, it
appears that neither party will be allowed to controvert that conclusion in
the proceeding to enforce or to cancel the judgment.29 If neither the judg-
25. Zerega Distrib. Co. v. Cough, supra note 24, at 896. See National Fin. Co. v.
Valdez, supra note 24; Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 1208 (1951). However, it has been
argued that it may be relatively easy for the creditor to make a prima facie case
of fraudulent misrepresentation, after which a difficult burden of rebutting this case
then shifts back to the bankrupt. Note, Bankruptcy Act: Abuse of Sections 14c(3) and
17a(2) by Small Loan Companies, 32 IowA L. Rv. 151, 159 (1957). Illustrating this
process, see Morris Fin. & Loan Co. v. Dickerson, 57 So. 2d 786 (La. App. 1952).
26. Bankruptcy Act § 17a(3) excepts debts which "have not been duly scheduled
in time for proof and allowance, with the name of the creditor, if known to the bank-
rupt, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bank-
ruptcy ... "
27. Hill v. Smith, 260 U.S. 592 (1923); Woerter v. David, supra note 23; Cou Im
§ 17.23.
28. United States Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Manning, 147 Cal. App. 2d 558, 305 P.2d
970 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Gregory v. Williams, 106 Kan. 819, 189 Fac. 932 (1920);
Ohio Fin. Co. v. Greathouse, supra note 13; National Fin. Co. v. Valdez, supra note
24; Annot., 170 A.L.R. 368 (1947).
29. Citizens Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gardner, 315 Mich. 689, 24 N.W.2d 410 (1946);
Karger v. Orth, 116 Minn. 124, 133 N.W. 471 (1911); Harrington & Goodman v.
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ment nor the record conclusively establishes the nature of the debt on
which the judgment was entered, the question arises as to the admissibility
of evidence outside the record to show whether the debt was dischargeable
or not. While it is conceded that neither the form in which the judgment
was entered nor the type of cause of action on which the suit was brought
controls the matter of the character of the obligation, a majority of the
decisions holds that the court must make its determination on the basis of
the implications of the entire record, and cannot properly admit outside
evidence on the issue.30 Thus, it has been declared:
[T]he overwhelming weight of authorities . . . appears to be to the effect that in
cases of this character, when suits have been brought on an obligation and same
has been reduced to judgment, the character of the obligation and the question
whether same is dischargeable in bankruptcy must be determined from the entire
record of the suit, but that no evidence is admissible to contradict or to go behind
or beyond the entire record of the suit.3 1
On the other hand, a rather determined minority holds that evidence out-
side of the record of the action may be admitted to establish the character
of the debt on which the judgment is based.32 This view is grounded on
the following reasoning: when the discharge is pleaded in a suit on a note,
proof is admissible to show that the debt for which the note was given was
of a non-dischargeable character; the entry of a judgment on a debt does
not change the character of the obligation; therefore, the nature of the
original obligation is controlling and should be provable by any available
Herman, 172 Mo. 344, 72 S.W. 546 (1903); Wasylldw v. Jendrowski, supra note 11;
Scott v. Corn, 19 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); CoLIa' § 17.17, at 1617.
30. In re La Porte, 54 F. Supp. 911 (W.D.N.Y. 1943) (debtor's evidence rejected);
In re Danahy, 45 F. Supp. 758 (W.D.N.Y. 1942) (creditor's evidence rejected);
Consolidated Plan v. Bonitatibus, 130 Conn. 199, 33 A.2d 140 (1943); Homer v.
Nerlinger, 304 Mich. 225, 7 N.W.2d 281 (1943); Rice v. Guider, 275 Mich. 14, 265
N.W. 777 (1936); National Sur. Corp. v. Toale, 188 Misc. 359, 67 N.Y.S.2d 44 (Munic.
Ct. 1946); In re Benoit, 124 App. Div. 142, 108 N.Y.S. 889 (1908); Campbell v.
Norgart, 73 N.D. 297, 14 N.W.2d 260 (1944); United Mercantile Agencies v. Wil-
liams, 87 Ohio App. 273, 94 N.E.2d 572 (1950); Chambers v. Kirk, 41 Okla. 696, 139
Pac. 986 (1914). It should be noted that decisions cited as authority for this proposi-
tion often go no further than holding that the court should go beyond the judgment
and consider the entire record; only by implication do they bear on the question of
the admissibility of outside evidence. E.g., Halligan v. Dowel, 179 Iowa 172, 161
N.W. 177 (1917); Bonnici v. Kindsvater, 275 Mich. 304, 266 N.W. 360 (1936); In re
Pulver, 146 Wash. 597, 264 Pac. 406 (1928).
31. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Sentilles, 160 So. 149, 150 (La. App. 1935).
32. Whelan v. United States Guarantee Co., supra note 24; United States Credit
Bureau, Inc. v. Manning, supra note 28; Fitzgerald v. Herzer, 177 P.2d 364 (Cal. App.
1947); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Golombosky, 133 Conn. 317, 50 A.2d 817 (1946); Levin
v. Singer, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 2242 (Md. Nov. 20, 1961); Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v.
Caruso, 252 Minn. 435, 90 N.W.2d 302 (1958). Other cases cited in the opinions of
the foregoing decisions as adopting this view often go no further than holding that
the court may "go behind the judgment" to determine the nature of the obligation,
and do not expressly state that evidence outside of the record may be admitted.
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evidence.3 3 And it is further argued that by limiting consideration to the
record, the creditor will frequently be prevented from showing the true
character of the obligation on which the judgment is based; if this happens,
the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act-to leave the bankrupt still liable on
debts dishonestly incurred-will be frustrated.m Because the creditor has
the burden of proof that the debt is non-dischargeable, the decisions under
the restrictive rule will go against him whenever the record is inconclusive
as to the dischargeable nature of the original obligation.35 Thus, the debtor
will ordinarily be relieved of a non-dischargeable liability when the credi-
tor's suit was based on a note given for a prior non-dischargeable debt,
or on a tort cause of action involving willful and malicious conduct not
brought out by the creditor in his complaint or proof.36 In view of this
inclination of the courts to restrict their consideration to the record, any
creditor bringing suit on an obligation owing to him should take care to
plead and prove any factors which would tend to establish the non-
dischargeable nature of the debt; otherwise, the subsequent bankruptcy of
the debtor will prevent enforcement of the judgment obtained in the suit.
Though in theory the discharge affords a bankrupt protection against lia-
bility on dischargeable debts, in actuality this protection often proves
inadequate because of the limited effect which the law attributes to a
discharge order. It is settled that a discharge does not extinguish the
bankrupts obligations, but rather only provides a personal defense against
their enforcement 3 7 Therefore, the granting of a discharge does not itself
affect even a debt which is dischargeable in nature; only when pleaded by
the bankrupt as an affirmative defense in a suit on that debt, or in a pro-
ceeding to enforce a judgment based on that debt, does the discharge serve
its purpose of protecting the bankrupt from liability.-8 If the bankrupt fails
33. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Golombosky, supra note 32, at 819. This case and its
reasoning are heavily relied on in the Manning and Caruso cases, supra note 32.
34. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Golombosky, supra note 32, at 820.
35. E.g., Halligan v. Dowell, supra note 30, at 180.
36. The minority courts also note the lack in opinions of the majority courts of any
apparent affirmative reason for restricting consideration to the record. Fidelity &
Cas. Co. v. Golombosky, supra note 32, at 819-20.
It has been suggested that the fact that the judgment was based on a note given for
a prior obligation is of some significance in explaining the divergence of opinion-
that a court which would approve going behind the record to determine the character
of the original obligation on which the judgment was directly based will not consent
to going behind both the record and the note to look at the original obligation. See
Annot., 170 A.L.R. 368 (1947). However, the cases cited in note 30 supra, supporting
the majority rule, do not bear out this analysis.
37. Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625 (1913); First Nat'l Bank v. Henderson, 243 Ala.
636, 11 So. 2d 366 (1942); Crandall v. Durham, 348 Mo. 240, 152 S.W.2d 1044
(1941); First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Parker, 232 N.C. 512, 61 S.E.2d 441
(1950); Friedman Fin. Co. v. Shirley, supra note 13; National Fin. Co. v. Valdez, supra
note 24.
38. The pleading of a discharge in bankruptcy does not constitute collateral attack
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to plead this defense properly, it is regarded as waived by him, and the
creditor is allowed to enforce his claim against the post-bankruptcy assets
of his debtor.39
Of course, there can be no objection to allowing a bankrupt to waive
his defense and voluntarily acknowledge his liability to pay the debt. If
he takes that step intentionally, he is commendably exercising his choice
to satisfy a moral obligation which could not be legally enforced. How-
ever, all too frequently it appears that the bankrupts failure to assert his
defense is not deliberate and is not based on an intention to be bound on
the obligation; rather, is due to inadvertence or misunderstanding on his
part. Mistakenly but naturally supposing that the discharge operates auto-
matically to release him from liability, or regarding himself as financially
unable to afford counsel to represent him, he fails to respond to the credi-
tor's suit on a debt; the result is a default judgment entered against him
without the matter of the dischargeability of the debt ever being passed
on by any court.40 On other occasions the bankrupt is lulled into a false
sense of security because the creditor, after a long delay following the
discharge, quietly and sometimes without notice to the defendant prose-
cutes a suit which was filed before the bankruptcy proceedings began 41
The courts generally show no inclination to disapprove a rule which pro-
duces such an unsatisfactory result in so many instances,4 2 though now
and then a judicial voice is raised in protest,43 and even more rarely a
court refuses to recognize such an inadvertent waiver. However, a fed-
eral court has recently taken the position that it has discretionary power
on a judgment on the debt rendered by a state court. Friedman Fin. Co. v. Shirley,
supra note 13.
39. Household Fin. Corp. v. Dunbar, 262 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1958); In re
Innis, supra note 20; Covington v. Robinson, 242 Ala. 337, 6 So. 2d 421 (1942); Aiken
v. Bank of Georgia, 101 Ga. App. 200, 113 S.E.2d 405 (1960); Elliott v. Warwick
Stores, Inc., 329 Mass. 406, 108 N.E.2d 681 (1952); Leeds, Inc. v. Love, supra note
23; Corn.Ta § 17.27.
40. E.g., Beneficial Loan Co. v. Noble, 129 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1942) (bankrupt
was advised by legal aid society employee to ignore creditor's suit because he had
been adjudicated a bankrupt); Helms v. Holmes, 129 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1942) (bank-
rupt "thought the discharge . . . operated as an automatic defense to any subsequent
action brought against him by a creditor on a claim which came within the discharge
.... "); Tune v. Vaughan, 90 Ark. 971, 281 S.W. 906 (1926) (bankrupt "suffered
judgment to be entered against him under the misapprehension that his discharge auto-
matically terminated the pending suit against him").
41. E.g., Gathany v. Bisbopp, supra note 17; In re Innis, supra note 20; Holmes v.
Rowe, supra note 20.
42. For the usual reaction, see In re Innis, supra note 20: "[The state court] was
not compelled to take judicial notice of the proceeding in bankruptcy in another court,
however seriously that proceeding might affect the rights of the parties to the suit
already pending. It was the duty of the state court to proceed to judgment between
the parties unless, by some proper pleading, it was informed of the changed relation
of any of the pArties to the suit's subject matter." 140 F.2d at 480.
43. See the dissent of Judge Paul in Helms v. Holmes, supra note 40, at 269.
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to give effect to a discharge even though it was not pleaded by the bank-
rupt. In that case the creditor sued to foreclose a trust deed in the same
federal court which had previously granted a discharge in bankruptcy to
the debtor, whose notes were secured by the trust deed. In the foreclosure
proceeding the debtor appeared as a witness, and evidence of the discharge
was admitted, but the debtor did not assert it as a defense because the
deed of trust lien survived the bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the district court
refused to enter a deficiency judgment against the debtor, and the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sustained that ruling, declaring:
While upon this record the court would perhaps have been justified in granting a
personal judgment against the bankrupt on his notes, we do not believe that the
court was compelled to do so. A court of equity has some discretion in determin-
ing the relief it will grant. The validity of defendant's discharge is not challenged.
We find nothing in the record to indicate the Bank was in any manner prejudiced
by the bankrupts failure to assert the discharge as a defense by answer .... The
court had an opportunity to see and hear the bankrupt as a witness and could
well have formed an impression that the bankrupt had no intention to waive his
discharge rights.44
Furthermore, it has been held in New York that failure of the bankrupt
to plead his discharge as a defense in the creditor's suit does not prevent
him from subsequently obtaining relief in a statutory proceeding for can-
cellation of the judgment rendered on a debt discharged in bankruptcy.45
Since the requirement that the bankrupt affirmatively plead his discharge
so often operates to enable creditors to impose severe hardships on their
bankrupt debtors and thereby to frustrate one of the main purposes of the
Bankruptcy Act, it seems that the rule should be modified. While a bank-
rupt should be permitted to forego the benefits of his discharge if he
knowingly chooses to do so, a rule requiring some positive action by the
bankrupt to constitute a waiver of the defense of discharge would eliminate
the worst evils of the present situation. Under such a rule a creditor, in
order to enforce a dischargeable debt, would have to show that the debtor
is affRrmatively waiving his discharge defense; in this way the current
practice of taking advantage of a bankrupts ignorance of the nature of his
rights and of the necessity of asserting his defense would be largely fore-
stalled. Since there appears to be no likelihood of the courts revising the
established practice, legislation would be necessary to achieve this result.
44. National Bank v. General Mills, Inc., 283 F.2d 574, 579 (8th Cir. 1960).
45. Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Breskin, 173 Misc. 1002, 18 N.Y.S.2d 704 (Sup.
Ct. 1940); Neish v. Doyle, 143 Misc. 694, 256 N.Y.S. 896 (Sup. Ct. 1932); Rukeyser
v. Tostevin, 188 App. Div. 629, 177 N.Y.S. 291 (1919). The New York statute (quoted
in the text accompanying note 22 supra) was construed to be mandatory, requiring
cancellation whenever the debt on which the judgment was based has been discharged
in bankruptcy. In California, the decisions under a very similar statute seem to be in
disagreement on this point. See Davison v. Anderson, 271 P.2d 233, 236 (Cal. Super.
1954); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Lipscomb, 104 P.2d 525, 526 (Cal. App. 1940).
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Perhaps a simple amendment to section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, specify-
ing that the discharge bars enforcement of all dischargeable debts unless
the bankrupt manifests his waiver of the defense by clear and affirmative
action, would provide the most effective solution.
The traditional practice of conferring on the state courts the function of
determining what debts are discharged in bankruptcy is open to criticism
on several grounds. First, it produces an anomalous system under which
the bankruptcy court is empowered to grant a discharge order, but can
issue only "a strange form of decree which must be taken to another court
for an interpretation of its effect."46 In order to obtain that interpretation,
the parties are put to the trouble, delay and expense of prosecuting and
defending an independent suit in another court, after having already been
before the bankruptcy court in a proceeding which directly concerned the
rights of the bankrupt and his creditors. The creditor, who may have
proved his claim in bankruptcy in order to receive payments out of the
estate and who may have also shown the nondischargeable character of
his debt in opposing the grant of a general discharge, must now bear the
burden of again asserting his cause of action in a state court and proving
that the obligation is not dischargeable. The debtor, in turn, must marshal
his proof that the debt was discharged, and in many cases this effort must
be made years after the debt was incurred and after the evidence needed
to establish the nature of the transaction out of which the obligation arose
has been dissipated. Furthermore, there is some cause to suspect that the
lower state courts may tend to restrict unduly the scope of the discharge,
to the prejudice of the bankrupt. This tendency may be due to the rela-
tively stronger influence of the creditor in the community, or to the common
lack of understanding of, or sympathy with, the social purposes of the
Bankruptcy Act. The federal bankruptcy courts, being directly involved
in the operation of the bankruptcy system, may be in a better position than
the state courts to view the matter in its proper perspective. And to leave
the determination of the effect of a bankruptcy discharge in the hands of
innumerable state courts of varying types and qualities is to destroy all
hope of ever achieving any semblance of uniformity of decision.
47
III. DETmEMINATION BY THE BANKRUPTCY CouRT OF THE
DisCaA GEABILFY OF SPECIFIC DEBTS
Because of the disadvantages, real or fancied, which may arise from re-
46. Twinem, Discharge-What Court Determines the Effect Thereof, 21 REF. J. 33,
34 (1946).
47. "The object of the Bankruptcy Act was to establish a uniform system of bank-
ruptcy, and with that end in view to take from the state courts the decision and
determination of all such questions and controversies as are by the act placed within
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts." Bothwell v. Fitzgerald, 219 Fed. 408, 415
(9th Cir. 1915).
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liance on the state courts for decisions as to whether particular debts are
dischargeable, the determination of the issue of dischargeability is fre-
quently sought in the federal bankruptcy courts. There is presently no
provision in the Bankruptcy Act specifically conferring this power on the
bankruptcy courts, though attempts to amend the act so as to grant such
authority have been made on a number of occasions. 48 However, even
without an express grant, jurisdiction to make determinations as to dis-
chargeability of debts has been established on at least four different bases.
A. The Power To Grant Stay Orders Under Section 11a
Section 11a provides that any suit which is pending against a person at
the time he files a bankruptcy petition and which is based on a claim that
would be released by a discharge in bankruptcy (a) shall be stayed pend-
ing an adjudication or dismissal of the petition, and (b) may be further
stayed, after an adjudication, until the question of the granting of a dis-
charge is settled.49 The purpose of such a temporary stay is to enable the
debtor to forestall attempts of his creditors to enforce their claims against
him before he is able to obtain a discharge which can be pleaded as a de-
fense to the enforcement of his liabilities.50 The term "suits . . .pending"
is construed to include not only an original action to obtain a judgment,
but also a proceeding to enforce a judgment already rendered, such as
levy of execution, garnishment, and so on.51
Since the power to grant a stay exists only in regard to suits on claims
"from which a discharge would be a release,"52 the bankruptcy court must
48. Two such recent attempts are represented by: (1) H.R. 11543, 84th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1956), which would have added a paragraph 22 to section 2a of the Bankruptcy
Act, beginning as follows: "Determine the dischargeability or nondischargeabflity of
all provable debts ...... No action was taken on this bill, which died with the
adjournment of Congress. The same proposal was reintroduced in the Eighty-fifth
Congress as House Bill 106 and was approved by the House of Representatives. (2)
H.R. 4150, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), also proposing an addition of paragraph 22,
beginning as follows: "Upon application of the bankrupt and the creditor concerned
determine the dischargeability or non-dischargeability of all provable debts .... ."
This bill was passed by the House of Representatives on September 7, 1959; but,
like H.R. 106, supra, it was never adopted by the Senate.
49. For general discussion, see CoLLum §§ 11.02-.08. The "shall" and "may" termi-
nology is taken to mean that the grant of the stay is mandatory prior to adjudication
but discretionary after adjudication. In re Locker, 30 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1940);
Smith v. Phiegar, 73 Ariz. 11, 236 P.2d 749 (1951).
50. Matter of Palter, 151 F. Supp. 278 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); In re S. W. Straus & Co.,
6 F. Supp. 547, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); In re De Lauro, 1 F. Supp. 678, 680 (D. Conn.
1932); In re Nuttall, 201 Fed. 557, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1912).
51. CoixaER § 11.03; In re Adler, 144 Fed. 659 (2d Cir. 1906); Greenfield v. Tuc-
cillo, 129 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1942); Matter of Palter, supra note 50; Shabaz v. Henn,
supra note 19.
52. Bankruptcy Act § Ila, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 549 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 29a (1958). 11 U.S.C. § 29a (1960 Supp.). See Family Small Loan Co. v. Mason,
67 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1933); Holmes v. Davidson, 84 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1936);
Binnian v. Bookey, 48 Wash. 2d 342, 294 P.2d 410 (1956).
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necessarily pass on the dischargeability of the claim in the process of
deciding whether a stay shall issue.5 3 In the case of In re Metz it was
declared:
It therefore became the duty of the learned judge below to determine whether
or not, under section 11 of the Bankruptcy Act, the debt was dischargeable in
bankruptcy, in passing upon the stay sought and obtained. This was not a matter
of discretion. It was his duty to inquire into the nature of the cause of action
pending in the state court, the character of the judgment, so as to determine the
facts upon which the decree in the state court was based... and, after such knowl-
edge, then to determine whether or not the application of the petitioner for a stay
in the proceedings in the state court should be granted. 54
In such a proceeding, the burden is on the creditor to prove that his
claim is non-dischargeable, and if the nature of the claim is reasonably
debatable in this respect, the stay should be granted.55 Here again, there
appears to be some difference of opinion on the question of what evidence
the bankruptcy court may consider in making its decision as to the dis-
chargeable character of the debt. It has been declared that "where a state
court action has not been tried, the character of the claim is determined
from the plaintiff's pleading"; therefore the plaintiff has been cautioned
to draw his pleadings so as to show that the cause of action is non-
dischargeable, in order to avoid having a stay ordered pending the hearing
on the matter of the bankrupt's general discharge.57 When a judgment has
already been rendered in the state court and the debtor seeks a stay of its
enforcement, some courts have stated that the bankruptcy court will not
go behind the judgment as shown by the record of the action in which
the judgment was remitted.m However, in Greenfield v. Tuccillo the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit asserted that "if the record does
not disclose the nature of the claim it may be proved aliunde."59
53. Greenfield v. Tuccillo, supra note 51; In re Scheffler, 68 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1934);
In re Byrne, 296 Fed. 98 (2d Cir. 1924). See Hisey v. Lewis Gale Hosp., 27 F. Supp.
20, 23 (W.D. Va. 1939).
It is to be noted that the power to grant the stay is not limited to the bankruptcy
court. Either that tribunal or the state or federal court in which the creditor's suit is
pending may act in this regard, and the "proper procedure" is sometimes declared to
be to apply first to the court in which the suit is pending. If the stay is refused there,
the debtor should then seek relief in the bankruptcy court. In re Innis, supra note 20;
Smith v. Phieger, supra note 49; COL=ER § 11.08.
54. 6 F.2d 962, 963-4 (2d Cir. 1925). 1
55. Greenfield v. Tuccillo, supra note 51; In re Millkofsky, 17 F. Supp. 127
(W.D.N.Y. 1936); In re Kimmel, 28 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); In re De Lauro,
supra note 50.
56. Binnian v. Bookey, supra note 52, at 412; In re Alvino, 111 F.2d 642 (2d Cir.
1940).
57. In re Lusch, 251 Fed. 316 (E.D.N.Y. 1918); Bohn v. Watson, 130 Cal. App. 2d
.24, 278 P.2d 454 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954).
58. Harper v. Rankin, 141 Fed. 626 (4th Cir. 1905); In re Lusch, supra note 57, at
317; In re Kimmel, supra note 55, at 943. See COLLIER § 17.28.
59. 129 F.2d 854, 856 (2d Cir. 1942). See In re Millkofsky, supra note 55, at 128;
1961 1
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The finding of the bankruptcy court that a stay should be granted does
not bind the state court in a subsequent action brought by the creditor to
enforce his claim on the ground that it is non-dischargeable. 60 One court
has explained that the granting of a stay is a step taken as an incident to
the administration of the Bankruptcy Act-presumably to prevent a credi-
tor from frustrating the purposes of the act by collecting his debt in full
from the inadequate assets of the debtor and by depriving the debtor of
the benefit of his discharge. And "any determination of the question [of
the dischargeability of a particular claim] made by this court as an inci-
dent to administration is not binding upon the parties in independent pro-
ceedings arising in the state courts, after the administration of bankruptcy
has been concluded."61
The relief available to a bankrupt under section Ila is subject to two
serious limitations. First, the stay can be granted only against suits which
are pending when the bankruptcy petition is filed; it is not available to
protect against proceedings begun after the filing of the petition. Sec-
ond, the stay serves only as a temporary bar to prosecution of the suit until
the matter of bankrupt's discharge is determined; it does not effect a
dismissal of the action nor finally establish the dischargeability of the
claim on which the suit is based. Thus, the debtor must look to other
remedies to guard against the eventual enforcement of dischargeable debts.
B. The Power To Make Orders Necessary for the Enforcement of the
Provisions of the Bankruptcy Act Under Section 2(15)
A few courts have relied on another section of the Bankruptcy Act as a
source of authority for the granting of permanent relief against attempts
of creditors to collect dischargeable claims. Section 2, the general grant
of power to the bankruptcy courts, provides in subsection 15 that these
courts may "make such orders, issue such process, and enter such judg-
ments, in addition to those specifically provided for, as may be necessary
for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act .... ." In contrast to the
situation under section 1la, the court's power to intervene is not limited
to suits pending at the time of the filing of the petition, and the effect of
its intervention does not terminate when the discharge in bankruptcy is
granted. Rather, under section 2(15) the court may restrain any proceed-
ings when such a move is necessary to enforce the provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
It has been authoritatively observed that this subsection, notwithstanding
its broad language, was enacted for the sole purpose of giving the court the
Swig v. Tremont Trust Co., 8 F.2d 943, 945 (1st Cir. 1925); Family Small Loan Co.
v. Mason, supra note 52.
60. In re Millkofsky, supra note 55; CoLLIER § 11.04.
61. In re De Lauro, supra note 50, at 681.
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power needed to protect its own custody of the bankrupt's estate and to
prevent interference with its administration of that estate.62 In this view,
the distinction is drawn that while section 11a authorizes the court to
restrain in personam suits against the bankrupt in order to protect him
against harassment before his discharge is granted, the power conferred
by section 2(15) is intended to be applied to restrain in rem actions which
"tend to impair or defeat the paramount jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court in administering the bankrupt estate."63 This power would ordinarily
be invoked by the bankruptcy trustee or receiver as a means of protecting
the estate, primarily for the benefit of the bankrupts creditors.
Nevertheless, in several instances section 2(15) has been made the
basis for a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to protect the bankrupt by en-
joining a creditor's attempt to collect a debt. In determining that this
relief was to be given, the courts of course found it necessary to pass on
the question of the dischargeability of the debts involved. Thus, in Sea-
board Small Loan Corp. v. Ottinger" a lender was permanently enjoined
from enforcing an assignment of future wages which the borrower had
given, prior to his bankruptcy, to secure repayment of the loan. Having
decided that the debt was discharged and that the assignment could not
create a lien on future wages which would survive the discharge of the
debt purported to be secured, the court stated the ground for its jurisdiction
in these words:
In view of this purpose of the act [to give the debtor a fresh start economically]
and of the express provision that the bankrupt shall be released from all provable
debts, it would be indeed a strange situation if the court vested with jurisdiction
to enforce the act were without power to stay the hand of a creditor whose debt
has been discharged by bankruptcy, but who nevertheless persists in harassing the
bankrupt with efforts to collect it. . . . The demand under an assignment order,
in an effort to collect a debt discharged by bankruptcy, is nothing less than an
attempt to circumvent the order discharging same and to deprive the bankrupt of
the benefit of that order. It was to meet situations such as this that the bank-
ruptcy court was vested with the general power under section 2, subsection 15...
to "make such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments . . .as may be
necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this title."
65
n more recent decisions the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
twice relied on this provision of the act as a grant of power to enjoin the
62. See COLLIE §§ 2.61, 11.02.
63. In re S. W. Straus & Co., supra note 50.
64. 50 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1931) (citing In re Home Discount Co., 147 Fed. 538
(N.D. Ala. 1906) as a decision to the same effect).
65. 50 F.2d at 859. This decision was relied on as authority for enjoining a credi-
tor's action to enforce a mortgage to collect a discharged claim in Sims v. jamison, 67
F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1933). And see Hisey v. Lewis-Gale Hosp., supra note 53, at 25,
referring to § 2(15) as a basis for granting a temporary injunction pending discharge
to restrain a creditor from prosecuting a suit which was filed subsequent to the bank-
ruptcy petition and therefore not subject to being stayed under § la.
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enforcement of claims found by the court to be discharged in bankruptcy.66
In view of the approval accorded the result of the Ottinger case in numer-
ous other decisions, this basis of jurisdiction might have been invoked more
frequently in later cases had not the Supreme Court shortly supplied the
bankruptcy courts with a more reliable foundation for the exercise of their
injunctive powers against creditors.
C. The Power of an Equity Court To Entertain an Ancillary Bill
To Effectuate a Prior Adjudication
In 1934, only three years after the decision in the Ottinger case, the
question of the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction to pass on the discharge-
ability of a debt and to enjoin a creditor from enforcing a dischargeable
debt was finally presented squarely to the Supreme Court in Local Loan
Co. v. Hunt.67 Here again, the debtor borrowed a small sum from the loan
company and as security for repayment executed an assignment of wages
to be earned in the future. In about six months the debtor filed a volun-
tary petition in bankruptcy in a federal district court in Illinois, listing this
loan among his liabilities, and in due time he was granted a discharge in
bankruptcy. One week after the discharge, the loan company brought suit in
a Chicago municipal court to enforce the wage assignment against wages
earned subsequent to the adjudication in bankruptcy. The debtor imme-
diately commenced a proceeding in the bankruptcy court to enjoin the
company from further prosecuting the municipal court action or in any
other way attempting to enforce the claim under the wage assignment.
The injunction was granted, and was upheld by the court of appeals.68
Before the Supreme Court, the company argued that (1) the bankruptcy
court had no jurisdiction to enjoin prosecution of the municipal court suit;
(2) if such jurisdiction did exist, the suit should not have been enjoined
because it was brought to enforce a valid lien created by the wage assign-
ment; (3) regardless of the rule in other jurisdictions, under the law of
Illinois such a lien was valid, and the federal courts were bound by the Illi-
nois law in this case. All three contentions were rejected, and the lower
court's decision was affirmed.
In establishing the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to issue the in-
junction, the Supreme Court cited the Ottinger case with approval, but did
not rely on section 2(15) of the Bankruptcy Act. Rather, the Court de-
clared: "That a federal court of equity has jurisdiction of a bill ancillary to
an original case or proceeding in the same court, whether at law or in
66. General Protestant Orphan's Home v. Ivey, 240 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1956);
Evans v. Dearborn Mach. Movers Co., 200 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1953).
67. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
68. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 67 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1933). In granting relief, the
court relied on its own decision in In re Skorcz, 67 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1933), which
in turn relied on Seaboard Small Loan 'Corp. v. Ottinger, supra note 64.
[VeOL. 15
EFFECT OF DISCHARGE
equity, to secure or preserve the fruits and advantages of a judgment or
decree rendered therein, is well settled. . . . These principles apply to
proceedings in bankruptcy."69
Having thus broadly confirmed the existence of the bankruptcy court's
authority to "determine the effect of the adjudication and order, and en-
join [the company] from its threatened interference therewith," the Su-
preme Court immediately advised restraint in the use of this power:
It does not follow, however, that the court was bound to exercise its authority.
And it probably would not and should not have done so except under unusual cir-
cumstances such as here exist.... As will be shown in a moment, the sole question
at issue is one which the highest court of the State of Illinois had already resolved
against [the bankrupt's] contention. The alternative of invoking the equitable
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court was for [the bankrupt] to pursue an obviously
long and expensive course of litigation, beginning with an intervention in a munici-
pal court and followed by successive appeals through the state intermediate and
ultimate courts of appeal, before reaching a court whose judgment upon the merits
of the question had not been predetermined. The amount in suit is small, and ...
such a remedy is entirely inadequate because of the wholly disproportionate trou-
ble, embarrassment, expense, and possible loss of employment which it involves.70
The Court then went on to lay down the rule that the assignment of
future wages did not, within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, consti-
tute a lien which could be enforced against wages earned after the adjudi-
cation, because the debt which the assignment was intended to secure was
released by the discharge in bankruptcy. And the Illinois rule which would
recognize such a lien was declared not to be binding on the bankruptcy
court, because such a view would be subversive of the general purpose of
the Bankruptcy Act to give the honest but unfortunate debtor a fresh
economic start in life unburdened by pre-existing debts.
With the existence of the bankruptcy courts' power to intervene to pre-
vent the enforcement of a discharged debt in a state court thus finally
established, attention now shifted to the problem of determining what
circumstances justify the exercise of that power. The Supreme Court has
not spoken further in the matter, and, as might be expected, a wide variety
of opinion has been expressed elsewhere on this pointY1
In support of limiting this authority narrowly, emphasis is placed on the
Supreme Court's reference to "unusual circumstances such as here exist."
This means, it is argued, that the bankruptcy court should interfere only
69. 292 U.S. at 239-40. Several lower court cases cited by the loan company were
noted by the Supreme Court, but were repudiated: "To the extent that these cases
conflict with the view just expressed they are clearly not in harmony with the general
rule in equity announced by this court." 292 U.S. at 240.
70. 292 U.S. at 241-42. The court referred to Seaboard Small Loan Corp. v.
Ottinger, supra note 64, as support for the assertion in the final sentence quoted.
71. See Boroff, The Proper Forum for the Determination of the Effect of a Dis-
charge in Bankruptcy, 34 REF. J. 81 (1960).
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in the specific situation which was involved in the Hunt case-that is, (a)
where the rule of law in force in the state courts in which the creditor is
suing would make non-dischargeable an obligation which is regarded as
discharged under federal bankruptcy law, and (b) where the debtor ob-
tains relief from the federal court before any judgment has been entered
in the creditor's action by a state court. In such a situation, the federal
court will not be required to pass on any disputed issue of fact as regards
the circumstances under which the debt was incurred; rather, it will
merely apply a rule of bankruptcy law to an agreed state of facts. Further-
more, since the state court has not yet made any determination of the
issues in the case, the principle of res judicata does not apply to prevent
the federal court from taking jurisdiction.
To sustain the view that this authority should be broadly asserted, em-
phasis is placed on the Supreme Court's reference to the inadequacy of
the remedy available to the debtor outside of the bankruptcy court. The
crux of the reasoning in the Hunt decision, it is argued, is that the federal
court should intervene on behalf of the bankrupt whenever the remedies
which he might pursue in the state courts are for any reason inadequate to
afford him due protection against the enforcement of a dischargeable
debt. The insufficiency of these remedies may arise from a wide variety of
factors other than an adverse rule of law such as was encountered in the
Hunt case. And the bankrupts need for relief may be demanding enough
in some situations to justify intervention by the federal court even after
a state court judgment has been rendered in favor of the creditor.
In the process of applying the rule of the Hunt case over a period of a
quarter of a century, different lower federal courts have apparently adopted
each of these extreme interpretations, as well as several intermediate posi-
tions, in passing on bankrupts' requests for relief.
1. Relief Sought by the Bankrupt Prior to Judgment in State Court.
Since the Hunt decision granted relief in the form of an injunction against
prosecution of a suit still pending in the state court, its rule would seem to
extend most clearly to situations in which the creditor had not yet ob-
tained a judgment. However, the reports contain relatively few cases in
which the bankrupt's request for relief from the bankruptcy court was made
prior to entry of a judgment for the creditor in the state court. Presumably,
this is due to the fact that a bankrupt who becomes aware, at this stage
of the proceedings, of the danger of the dischargeable debt being enforced,
ordinarily follows the customary procedure of pleading his discharge as a
defense in the state court action. If this move is effective, he needs no aid
from the bankruptcy court. If it is not effective, a decision in favor of the
creditor results and the bankrupt then turns to the bankruptcy court to
prevent the enforcement of the judgment.
No court seems to have been called on to apply the Hunt rule to the
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same type of situation as was there involved. The Supreme Court's
positive declarations apparently have convinced creditors that the federal
court would properly intervene on behalf of the bankrupt when the law
controlling the state court would enable the creditor to enforce a debt
which is dischargeable under bankruptcy law.7 2
In the post-Hunt cases in which the bankrupt has sought to have the
bankruptcy court enjoin the creditor from prosecuting a suit to collect a
debt, it was not predetermined that either the state court's application of
the law or its resolution of fact issues would necessarily be adverse to the
bankrupt. Observing the Supreme Court's cautionary note, the federal
courts have generally agreed that they should refuse to interfere with the
state court proceeding when the bankrupt fails to show any unusual cir-
cumstances which would render inadequate his remedy of pleading his
discharge as a defense.73 In this regard, it has been held that neither the
creditor's failure to enter an objection to the granting of a general discharge
nor his abstention from filing a claim for payment of his debt in the regular
course of the bankruptcy proceedings estops him from later suing to collect
the debt on the theory that it is not dischargeable. A creditor is under no
legal duty to oppose a discharge nor to notify the bankruptcy court that a
ground for refusing a discharge exists.74 And a creditor with a claim
which he believes to be non-dischargeable may pursue the alternative
courses of filing his claim in order to obtain payment in the distribution
of the assets of the bankrupt estate or of suing on the debt in a non-
bankruptcy court in order to obtain payment out of the debtor's after-
acquired property.75 Although it may be desirable to motivate creditors to
72. It is to be noted that in In re Skorcz, supra note 68, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit had reached this conclusion a year before the Supreme Court's
decision in the Hunt case. The facts in the two cases were basically the same, except
that in the Hunt case the bankrupts discharge had been granted before federal court
intervention was sought, whereas in the Skorcz case, the discharge was still pending.
73. White v. Public Loan Corp., 247 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1957); California State
Bd. of Equalization v. Coast Radio Prods., 228 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1955). See Grand
Union Equip. Co. v. Lippner, 167 F.2d 958, 960 (1948).
74. White v. Public Loan Corp., supra note 73. Relying on In re Walton, 51 F.
Supp. 857 (W.D. Mo. 1943), the bankrupt contended that the creditor was estopped
from enforcing his claim because he bad failed to object to the granting of a general
discharge. The court of appeals denied that any such estoppel exists, and expressly
repudiated the Walton case. In accord on this point: State Fin. Co. v. Morrow, 216
F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1954); In re Barber, 140 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1944); Watts v.
Ellithorpe, 135 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1943); In re Anthony, 42 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Ill.
1941).
75. California State Bd. of Equalization v. Coast Radio Prods., supra note 73. The
bankrupt contended that the creditor should be barred from collecting the debt be-
cause if he had filed his claim in bankruptcy he would have received full payment,
since he had a priority claim. The district court sustained this argument, on the rea-
soning that to allow the creditor to collect his debt out of the debtor's post-bankruptcy
assets "would be inequitable and unjust and would deny to bankrupts the benefits of
the bankruptcy act .... ." 228 F.2d at 522. The court of appeals rejected this point
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disclose matters which make the bankrupt unworthy of a discharge, and
although it may be somewhat unfair for a creditor deliberately to choose
to collect his debt out of post-bankruptcy assets, neither of these factors
has been viewed by the courts as creating unusual circumstances of the
type which justify interference with state court proceedings. 76
However, in several instances the federal courts have found what they
regarded as exceptional factors which gave rise to a need for intervention
for the bankrupts protection. Some decisions have laid emphasis on the
concern expressed in the Hunt case regarding the "trouble, embarrassment,
expense and possible loss of employment" which may threaten the bank-
rupt left solely to the pursuit of his remedy in the state courts. Thus, in
State Finance Co. v. Morrow,77 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
approved the issuance of a permanent injunction against the prosecution of
a creditor's suit in which the bankrupt had not even appeared to plead his
discharge as a defense. In the course of his opinion, Judge Murrah ob-
served:
True, a rightful regard for state court proceedings requires the bankruptcy court
to inquire into the nature of the remedy in the state court. But it is important to
bear in mind that the remedy afforded to the bankrupt by federal law is not
merely a legal remedy in the form of burdensome litigation with successive appeals
to reach a court of record. It is a remedy adequate to meet the full requirements
of justice-a remedy which comports with the spirit and purpose of the bankruptcy
act to secure to the bankrupt the full and complete benefits and advantages of his
diseharge.t8
The court's examination of the "judicial processes" in the justice of the
peace court in which the creditor's suit was pending produced the con-
clusion that "for all practical purposes the bankrupt was defenseless
[there] ," because "the issues are so loosely cast" that it could not be deter-
mined whether a judgment for the creditor might be based on "the debt
for which the note was given [which was dischargeable] or the fraud which
may have induced it."79
Years earlier a federal district court in Georgia granted the same type of
relief to a bankrupt, declaring that this suit was merely one instance of
many in which:
of view and declined to enjoin the creditor from enforcing his debt. See Oglebay,
Some Developments in Bankruptcy Law, 18 REF. J. 9, 14 (1943).
76. In re Walton, supra note 74, which held to the contrary on the basis of the public
interest in the prevention of unwarranted discharges of dishonest debtors, was severely
criticized before being discarded by the White case. See COLLER § 14.07 n.4; Ogle-
bay, Some Developments in Bankruptcy Law, 18 REF. J. 68, 74 (1944).
77. 216 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1954).
78. Id. at 680.
79. Ibid. The court continued: "It is these practical considerations which prompt
bankruptcy courts to exercise their equitable protective powers. Indeed, it is these
considerations which impose upon them the inescapable duty to vouchsafe the integrity
of their decrees." Ibid.
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[C]reditors ... follow the practice of ignoring the bankruptcy court and virtually
annulling its orders of discharge by coercive measures, taken after discharge, in
the nature of suits in state courts on dischargeable debts, or threats of garnishment
proceedings against, or of notices to employers of bankrupts which would result in
loss of their employment; and by harassing them in many other ways.8 0
This court went on to note that in many instances bankrupts are deprived
of their intended economic rebirth because they are either ignorant of the
necessity of pleading their discharge in the state suit or are not financially
able to employ counsel to represent their interests in such suits. "It is this
situation and these conditions which constitute the equity of petitions of
this kind and which should cause this court to do what it can to stop such
practices in defiance of its own orders . . . and to afford to debtors the
relief to which they are entitled under the bankruptcy law ....- 81
The "unusual circumstances" basis for injunctive relief has also been
found in a chapter XII arrangement proceeding in which the court granted
a general discharge and expressly enjoined the United States from attempt-
ing to collect certain penalties and interest on a delinquent tax claim.8
The government contended that the issue of the dischargeability of these
debts should be left for decision in whatever court they might later be sued
upon; but the federal court rejected this argument because the govern-
ment's claim was based on a statutory lien which would need no judgment
to make it effective, and therefore the bankrupt would apparently not
have any opportunity to plead his discharge as a defense.
Employing the familiar language of the Hunt case to support their juris-
diction, but not specifying precisely the nature of the unusual circumstances
in the cases, federal courts have enjoined creditors' actions to enforce debts
found to be discharged as a result of a chapter X reorganizations and a
chapter XI arrangement.8
2. Relief Sought by the Bankrupt Subsequent to Judgment in State Court
(a) Decisions Refusing To Exercise Jurisdiction To Determine the Dis-
chargeability of a Debt.-In most of the reported cases in which the
bankrupt has sought the protection of the bankruptcy court, he has, for
various reasons, failed to make this move until after the creditor has ob-
80. In re Cleapor, 16 F. Supp. 481, 483-84 (N.D. Ga. 1936).
81. Id. at 484.
82. United States v. Mighell, 273 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1959). Accord, National
Foundry Co. v. Director, 229 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1956).
83. Evans v. Dearborn Mach. Movers Co., supra note 66: "[T~he district court, in
issuing the injunction appealed from, did no more than act to secure and preserve for
[the debtor] the fruits and advantages of its decree ...... 200 F.2d at 128.
84. Sword Line, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'r, 212 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1954): "While
injunction against state proceedings is undesirable, it is nevertheless recognized as
necessary where preservation of federal dispositions in bankruptcy and protection
and enforcement of federal decrees in legal rehabilitation of corporations are neces-
sary." 212 F.2d at 870.
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tained a judgment on the debt in a state court. In some instances, he has
appeared in the state court at some stage of the proceedings and contested
the creditor's right to enforce the debt. In other cases he has failed to par-
ticipate in the state suit and has suffered a default judgment, either deliber-
ately or through ignorance or inability to employ counsel. In either situa-
tion, the courts which have rejected the plea for injunctive relief against
attempts of the creditor to enforce the judgment have indulged in one or
more of three courses of reasoning.
Most often the principle of res judicata is cited as preventing the issue
of the dischargeability of the debt from being relitigated in the bankruptcy
court. Thus, only a year after the Hunt case, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in the case of In re Devereaux declared:
Here the bankrupt voluntarily initiated a proceeding in the state court to have his
discharge adjudicated a bar to collection of the judgment; the judgment creditor
appeared and contested; and the court found the facts and the law against the
bankrupts claim that the judgment was released. To permit the same issue to
be relitigated in the bankruptcy court, while the order of the state court remains
unreversed, is contrary to the most elementary principles of res judicata and the
comity which exists between federal and state courts.85
The same principle was applied by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
in a case in which the bankrupt had, at the suggestion of an ill-advised
legal aid society employee, refrained from defending in the creditor's suit
and so suffered a default judgment.86 When the creditor started garnish-
ment proceedings, the debtor sought the aid of the referee in bankruptcy,
who found the debt to be dischargeable and enjoined further attempts to
enforce the judgment. The bankruptcy court sustained the injunction, with
,the observation that "if the referee was wrong in his finding and decision,
then these loan companies have at last discovered a very effective means
of collecting their debts and defying the bankruptcy court, and the latter
may as well close up."87 In spite of this portentous warning, the court of
appeals held the issuance of the injunction to be error, because the matters
heard and determined in the state court could not be relitigated in the
federal court. However, it was observed that the bankruptcy court would
have the power to enjoin the creditor from enforcing the state court judg-
ment if it could be shown that the judgment was obtained through "ex-
trinsic or collateral fraud."
85. 76 F.2d 522, 523 (2d Cir. 1935). This case was followed in In re Epstein, 48
F. Supp. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). See In re Grover, 63 F. Supp. 644, 647 (D.C. Minn.
-1945); In re Marshall, 24 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) (creditor, having sued on
the debt in state court which ultimately found debt dischargeable, sought a federal
-court injunction to prevent bankrupt from pleading discharge in defense of judgment
enforcement proceedings).
86. Beneficial Loan Co. v. Noble, supra note 40. See In re Cox, 33 F. Supp. 796,
799 (W.D. Ky. 1940).
87. In re Noble, 42 F. Supp. 684, 688 (D. Colo. 1941).
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One court which held that federal court relief must be denied under the
res judicata doctrine suggested that this rule would not apply in a case in
which the creditor had obtained his judgment prior to the tihe the bank-
rupt was granted his general discharge; presumably, this was because in
such a situation the discharge could not have been pleaded in defense and
therefore the state court could not have passed on the question of whether
the debt was released by the discharge. 88 However, most of the courts
appear to regard this factor as irrelevant to the application of res judicata. 9
The latter position may be supported by the fact that the state court could
determine that the debt was of a non-dischargeable character even though
the discharge had not yet been granted, and that there are various post-
judgment remedies in the state courts which afford the bankrupt an oppor-
tunity to assert his discharge as a bar to the enforcement of the judgment
already entered.
The second reason commonly advanced for denying an injunction against
the enforcement of a judgment is that the bankrupt, by his negligence in
failing to plead his discharge in defense in the state suit, has disqualified
himself from invoking the protection of equity. This point of view was
most forcefully stated by Judge Dobie in Helms v. Holme :
It is a matter of Hornbook learning that a defendant in an action at law who
has a valid defense to a suit which is fully cognizable in a court of law and
within its jurisdiction, and which he has an adequate opportunity to interpose, is
chargeable with gross negligence if he fails to set up this defense, in the absence
of fraud, accident or surprise. Moreover, he cannot later seek relief in equity
against the enforcement of the judgment in that action, on the same grounds which
constituted his original defense.90
The fact that the failure to assert the defense of discharge is due to the
bankrupts mistaken impression that the bankruptcy court's order of dis-
88. Otte v. Cooks, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 861 (D. Minn. 1953).
89. The following are cases in which the res judicata principle was applied even
though the creditor's judgment was rendered prior to the bankruptcy discharge:
Csatari v. General Fin. Corp., 173 F.2d 798 (6th Cir. 1949); Walters v. Wilson, 142
F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1944); In re Devereaux, 76 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1935); In re Epstein,
supra note 85. In re Harris, 28 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Ill. 1939), in which the discharge
preceded the judgment, also relied on res judicata as a basis for refusing injunctive
relief to the bankrupt.
90. 129 F.2d 263, 265 (4th Cir. 1942). This language was specifically approved in
In re Innis, 140 F.2d 479, 480 (7th Cir. 1944). It is to be noted that in the Helms
case, the creditor delayed for 21/ years after the discharge was granted before bringing
suit in state court, where the judgment was entered by default. He then waited an-
other 6 years before making any move to enforce the judgment. At that time he
docketed the judgment in another county, and then after a delay of another 1- years
he started execution proceedings. Thus, the creditor delayed a full decade after the
discharge before attempting to enforce the judgment. See Judge Paul's long and per-
suasive dissenting opinion in which he argues that the case presented a situation in
which the bankruptcy court's power to enjoin a creditor who is ignoring the discharge
order should be exercised. 129 F.2d at 268.
1961 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
charge operates automatically to release him from liability on all of his
dischargeable debts is not regarded as a sufficient excuse for his inaction.91
As is to be expected, in most of the cases applying this reasoning, the dis-
charge has been granted some time prior to the entry of the creditor's
judgment; 92 however, even where the discharge was not obtained until
after the judgment, the bankrupts failure to assert the discharge in bar in
subsequent proceedings brought by the creditor to enforce the judgment
may constitute such negligence as will preclude equitable relief.
93
The third line of reasoning, sometimes appearing alone in an opinion
but more often complementing one of the other considerations, is that no
"unusual circumstances" exist in the particular situation to justify inter-
vention by a federal court in the state judicial processes being employed by
the creditor.94 While some opinions fail to explain why the court found
the bankrupt not to need its protection,95 in most of the cases denying
relief the opinions point out the state remedies which would have provided
or still do provide adequate means with which the bankrupt could prevent
enforcement of the judgment if the obligation on which it is based was
discharged. In some instances the remedy is merely an appeal to a higher
state tribunal for reversal of the judgment entered for the creditor in the
trial court 96 In other states, there are various statutory proceedings in
which the bankrupt may obtain cancellation of a judgment obtained prior
to the issuance of his discharge, apparently even after the time has passed
for appeal in the suit which resulted in the judgment.
9 7
Rarely have the courts attempted to explain in general terms what types
91. Helms v. Holmes, supra note 90; In re Innis, supra note 90.
92. See cases cited note 91 supra. See also Household Fin. Co. v. Dunbar, 262 F.2d
112 (10th Cir. 1958); In re Harris, supra note 89.
93. Gathany v. Bishopp, 177 F.2d 567 (4th Cir. 1949). The judgment was obtained
in an Illinois court prior to the debtor's bankruptcy adjudication in a federal court in
North Carolina in 1934. The bankrupts failure to oppose the creditor's proceeding in
Tthe Illinois court to revive the judgment in 1943 was held to bar him from equitable
relief.
1 94. Some cases simply declare that where a final judgment has been rendered in the
state court, the matter of "unusual circumstances" becomes irrelevant because the
res judicata principle precludes all further inquiry. In re Devereaux, 76 F.2d 522
'(2d Cir. 1935); Otte v. Cooks, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 861 (D. Minn. 1953).
95. Ciavarella v. Salituri, 153 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1946); Matter of Siegel, 164 F.
%Stipp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
96. In re Devereaux, supra note 94 (the court recognized the fact that this process
might require successive appeals through the state courts and finally to the United States
-Supreme Court-all to avoid a $500 judgment); Otte v. Cooks, Inc., supra note 94.
1 97. Csatari v. General Fin. Co., supra note 89; In re Epstein, supra note 85; In re
-Grover, supra note 85; In re Stoller, 25 F. Supp. 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) (cancellation
cannot be secured until one year after the discharge under the New York statute, but
in the meantime the bankrupt may apply to the state court for modification of the
.garnishment order on the ground that the debt was discharged). See In re Cox, supra




of circumstances are to be regarded as "unusual"; rather, in refusing to
grant an injunction, they have merely pointed out wherein the bankrupts
remedy in the state court lay in the particular situation involved. How-
ever, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has traced the general
boundaries which confine the power of the bankruptcy counts to interfere
with the enforcement of a state court judgment:
A court of equity treats all proceedings at law as valid and grants relief against
the consequences thereof only because the rights acquired thereby cannot be re-
tained in good conscience. .... A court of equity does not interfere on the ground
that injustice has been done, that a judgment is wrong in fact or law or that its
enforcement will work a great hardship, unless the complaining party was, with-
out his fault, deprived of his opportunity to present his defense on the merits ...
Chancery will intervene, therefore, only when the complainant was prevented
from presenting a meritorious defense by the inequitable conduct of his adversary
unmixed with negligence or fault on his own part .... 98
(b) Decisions Exercising Jurisdiction To Determine the Dischargeability
of a Debt.-Since the federal courts which see fit to exercise their jurisdic-
tion to determine whether a specific debt is dischargeable derive their
authority from the Hunt case, the familiar language of the Supreme Court's
opinion is regularly referred to in explaining what constitutes "unusual
circumstances" for this purpose. Thus, the opinions in these cases commonly
contain such general statements as: The bankruptcy court should take
jurisdiction "to secure or preserve the fruits and advantages" of its dis-
charge order and to prevent the frustration of the Bankruptcy Act's purpose
"to afford the debtor a fresh start" or the state remedy is inadequate .be-
cause its pursuit will cause the bankrupt serious "trouble, embarrassment,
expense and possible loss of employment." In some instances the courts
are content to use only such general terminology in designating the basis
for the bankrupts need for relief;99 in others, the factors which call for
federal court intervention to protect the bankrupt are spelled out with par-
ticularity and at length.
On one occasion, post-judgment relief has been justified on the existence
of the same type of situation as gave rise to the Hunt case. The rule of
law in effect in the courts of Georgia, where the creditor had obtained his
judgment, made the debt non-dischargeable as one incurred by false
representations. However, the bankruptcy court found, and the court of
appeals subsequently agreed, that under the admitted facts of the case,
the bankrupts actions did not amount to a making of false representations
98. In re Innis, 140 F.2d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 1944). This case was quoted with
approval in Household Fin. Co. v. Dunbar, 262 F.2d 112, 115 (10th Cir. 1958).
99. Holmes v. Rowe, 97 F.2d 537 (9th "Cir. 1938); General Protestant Orphan's
Home v. Ivey, supra note 66; In re Nichols, 22 F. Supp. 694 (W.D. Ky. 1938), .In re
Patt, 43 F. Supp. 754 (E.D. Tenn. 1941); In re Buzas, 58 F. Supp. 717. (N.D. Cal.
1944) (injunction denied on merits).
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within the meaning of section 17a of the Bankruptcy Act.10 Though the
appellate court did not specify the basis of federal court jurisdiction in the
matter, the same absence of adequate state remedy existed here as in the
Hunt case; that is, the bankrupt would have been required to litigate all
the way through the hierarchy of Georgia courts with the result predeter-
mined against him, and would eventually have had to resort to the United
States Supreme Court to prevent enforcement of the debt.
In the usual case, the lack of adequate protection for the bankrupt arises
from some factor of less obvious nature than an erroneous rule of state law,
and the question of whether the situation is one justifying federal inter-
vention is more difficult to answer. In Personal Industrial Loan Corp. V.
Forgay, one of the most notable of the decisions granting relief, the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit explained:
The power to enjoin proceedings in a state court involving a debt listed in the
bankruptcy proceedings or a judgment obtained on such a debt in a state court,
either during the bankruptcy proceedings or thereafter, is not an absolute power
and may be exercised only under such conditions as appeal to the equitable con-
science of the court.101
Here, the loan company failed to file any claim in the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, but rather instituted suit on the debt in a city court, alleging that
the borrower had made fraudulent representations as to his financial status
to procure the loan. A default judgment was entered, but thereafter the
bankrupt received his discharge and made several unsuccessful attempts
in the state courts to have the judgment set aside. When the company
attached his wages, the bankrupt sought and received from the bankruptcy
court an injunction against enforcement of the judgment by execution or
garnishment. 102 The court of appeals, in affirming, re-emphasized the lower
court's concern regarding loan companies which readily grant loans without
investigating the responsibility of the borrowers, and then, after the debtor
has resorted to bankruptcy, bypass the federal court and sue in a non-record
state court, where a default judgment is very often obtained without much
deliberation because the debtor is ignorant of the need for defending or is
financially unable to employ counsel. This is a strong recurring theme in
the opinions of most of the decisions in which creditors are restrained from
enforcing judgments based on discharged debts.103 A number of federal
100. In re Cal'dwell, 33 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Ga. 1940), aff'd sub non. Davison-
Paxon C6 v. -Caldwell, 115 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1940).
101. 240 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir. 1957). (Emphasis added.)
102. Matter of Forgay, 140 F. Supp. 473 (D. Utah 1956). The district court vrote
a long and persuasive opinion reviewing fully both the authorities supporting the issu-
ance of an injunction and the strong practical reasons demanding the granting of
such relief.
103. Holmes v. Rowe, supra note 99; In re Tillery, 16 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Ga.
1936); Hisey v. Lewis Gale Hosp., 27 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. Va. 1939); In re Nichols,
supra note 99; In re Taylor, 29 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Ga. 1939). See the dissenting
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district judges have apparently been greatly disturbed by the unprincipled
tactics of some creditors, especially certain small loan companies, in this
regard. 0 4
In the Forgay case, the court pointed out that the bankruptcy courts
"should give special attention to small debtors to the end that they are not
harassed by being dragged through expensive state court proceedings";
it was further observed that to require a bankrupt to exhaust his state
remedies before resorting to the federal court "would entail delay and
costs which the discharged debtor could ill afford and... would in a large
part deny him the benefits of an adjudication by the bankruptcy court." 05
Other courts have regarded the prohibitive cost of pursuing an appeal in
the state courts as justifying injunctive relief;1°6 especially in cases in which
the creditor has obtained a garnishment against the bankrupts wages,
the federal courts are often moved to find the kind of trouble, embarrass-
ment, oppression and harassment of the debtor which justifies the exercise
of jurisdiction under the Hunt rule.107 The fact that the creditors' suits on
relatively small debts are generally brought in state courts of very inferior
standing, where the judicial processes may be of questionable quality,
may well have some bearing on the decision of the federal courts to inter-
vene for the bankrupt's protection.0 8
In spite of the positive declarations made in some cases that the prin-
ciple of res judicata precludes a federal court from intervening after a
opinion in Helms v. Holmes, supra note 90, at 269. See Note, Bankruptcy Act: Abuse
of Sections 14c(3) and 17A(2) by Small Loan Companies, 32 INn. L.J. 151 (1957).
104. See especially: Matter of Forgay, supra note 102, at 477-78; In re Caldwell,
supra note 100, at 635; In re Taylor, supra note 103, at 657; Helms v. Holmes supra
note 40, at 269 (dissent). See also In re Anderson, 104 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Wis.
1952).
105. 240 F.2d at 19.
106. In re Connors, 93 F. Supp. 149, 150 (N.D. Ind. 1950): "The amount involved
is so insignificant when considered with the costs of an appeal that the bankrupt in
all likelihood would be compelled, if only for economic reasons, to forego an appeal.
Thus, a right granted by the Bankruptcy Act . . . is apt to be sacrificed and the
purposes of that law defeated."
107. The garnishment factor was present in most of the cases cited in notes 99-104
supra, and was especially emphasized in In re Caldwell, supra note 100, at 635; In re
Tillery, supra note 103, at 879; In re Taylor, supra note 103, at 657. See Poolman v.
Poolman, 289 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1961): "Since, in the instant case, [the credi-
tor's] attempts to collect her judgment by tying up the bankrupts wages and perhaps
jeopardizing his continued employment can be considered extra-ordinarily burdensome
if, in fact, she had no enforceable judgment after his discharge in bankruptcy, Local
Loan Co. v. Hunt . . . would seem to authorize the granting of injunctive relief."
(Relief was denied on the merits.) See Whelan v. U.S. Guarantee Co., 252 F.2d 851
(D.C. Cir. 1958) (no discussion of basis of jurisdiction). See Twinem, Discharge-
What Court Determines the Effect Thereof, 21 REa. J. 33, 34 (1946).
108. See Personal Industrial Loan Corp. v. Forgay, supra note 101, at 20; State
Fin. Co. v. Morrow supra note 74, at 680. In the Holmes, Tillery, Hisey and Nichols
cases, supra note 103, and in the Patt case, supra note 99, the creditors sued in courts
of approximately justice of the peace court standing.
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final judgment has been rendered in the state court,109 relief has been
given in such situations, without regard to whether the creditor's judgment
had preceded the grant of the discharge or had followed it, or whether the
debtor had suffered a default judgment or had participated unsuccessfully
in the state suit. In most of the instances in which the bankruptcy courts
have found the unusual circumstances necessary to allow them to take
jurisdiction, their opinions contain no discussion of the effect of res judi-
cata.110 In Holmes v. Rowe, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
citing the Hunt and Ottinger cases as authority, concluded: "Nor do we
consider that the failure of the [debtor] to exhaust his remedies in the state
court would preclude the District Court from exercising its jurisdiction in
the matter.""' Apparently the bar which res judicata would ordinarily
create is obviated by the necessity for intervention to prevent circumvention
of the orders of the bankruptcy court and frustration of the purposes of
the Bankruptcy Act. Though in most cases the creditor's conduct has not
involved actual fraud but rather conduct which is inequitable in some
degree, the federal court may be regarded as acting under the same type
of power which enables an equity court to enjoin enforcement of a judg-
ment obtained by fraud.112 If this is the course of reasoning followed, the
act of knowingly resorting to harassing judicial procedure to collect a
discharged obligation seems to be regarded as amounting to fraud in this
situation.
In a few instances more specific reasons have been offered to explain
why res judicata does not prevent intervention by the bankruptcy court.
In one case it was asserted that the judgment in the state suit was not
res judicata on the question of whether the debt was dischargeable because
the judgment was entered prior to the granting of the discharge." 3 How-
ever, this factor does not seem to be controlling, as the federal courts have
taken jurisdiction to decide the question of dischargeability in several in-
109. See cases cited in note 94 supra, and discussion in text accompanying notes
85-89.
110. Poolman v. Poolman, supra note 107; In re Nichols, supra note 99; In re Taylor,
supra note 103; In re Patt, supra note 99; In re Buzas, supra note 99; In re Connors,
supra note 106.
111. See note 99 supra, at 540.
112. Thus, the injunction granted in the Holmes decision, supra note 99, has been
said to be justified by the fact that there prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition,
the creditor had told the debtor that a judgment on the debt had already been ren-
dered by the state court, which was not true. "If that had been true, the judgment
would have been discharged by the bankruptcy, but it was not true and the bankrupt
was deceived by something asserted to be a fact which was not a fact, the existence or
non-edstence of which very materially affected his legal rights. Consequently, the
court of equity properly intervened to grant relief from a judgment at law obtained
thereafter because of the deception practiced by the judgment creditor. This was
relief from fraud." In re Innis, supra note 98, at 481-82.
113. Davison-Paxon Co. v. Caldwell, supra note 100, at 191.
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stances in which the discharge order preceded the judgment in time.114
Even though the discharge has not yet been granted, the state court can,
and apparently often does, decide that the creditor's claim is non-discharge-
able in nature; moreover, though the bankrupt cannot plead the defense in
the original suit, he can assert it in bar of judgment-enforcement proceed-
ings brought by the creditor subsequent to the issuance of the discharge
order.
The factor more often mentioned as the basis of the federal court's right
to make its own determination on the question of dischargeability is the
failure of the creditor to plead facts in his complaint which sustain his
allegation that the obligation sued on was incurred through the false repre-
sentations of the debtor. A pleader's conclusion unsupported by facts does
not indicate that the judgment was in fact based on a non-dischargeable
claim.115 And -in failing to appear and so permitting a default judgment to
be entered, the debtor admits only facts well and properly pleaded.116
These decisions suggest the conclusion 'that where the record in the state
court suit shows that the judgment was based on a cause of action for
fraud not dischargeable in bankruptcy, the principle of res judicata prevents
the issue of dischargeability from being relitigated in the bankruptcy
court; but where the record either indicates that the judgment was on a
type of debt not dischargeable in nature or is indefinite in this regard, the
bankruptcy court is free to enjoin the enforcement of the judgment on its
own determination that the debt was discharged.
117
114. Holmes v. Rowe, supra note 99; In re Connors, supra note 106; In re Buzas,
supra note 99.
115. Personal Industrial Loan Corp. v. Forgay, supra note 101, at 20; In re Caldwell,
supra note 100, at 634-35.
116. Personal Industrial Loan Corp. v. Forgay, supra note 101, at 20; In re Tillery,
supra note 103, at 879.
117. Matter of Forgay, supra note 102, at 474. The court distinguished Beneficial
Loan Co. v. Noble, 129 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1942), on this basis, saying that there the
state judgment was entered in an action for damages for fraud, while here the judgment
was on the debtor's note. See Whelan v. U.S. Guarantee Co., 252 F.2d 851 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
See General Protestant Orphan's Home v. Ivey, supra note 66, at 240: "While the
subject matter of the state court suit and of the bankruptcy proceedings as to this
particular claim was identical, the causes of action were not identical. The judgment
of the state court did not determine whether the debt had been discharged. All that
it established was that [the creditor] . . . had a valid outstanding claim against [the
debtor] which was due and unpaid. The state court action in no way involved the
question whether the debt was included in 'Debts not affected by discharge . . .'
[under See. 17a(2)]. This question was decided by the Bankruptcy Court in the




D. The Power To Exempt Specific Debts in Granting a General
Discharge Under Section 14
A further means of having the bankruptcy court determine the dis-
chargeability of a particular debt lies in a creditor's petition to the
court that the general discharge order be so phrased as expressly to
exempt the debt from its operation. When this practice is followed, if
the debt is declared to be discharged both the creditor and the debtor are
spared the useless delay, trouble and expense of engaging in independent
litigation to establish the nature of the creditor's claim; and if the debt is
declared to be non-dischargeable, the debtor may well be induced to ar-
range for payment without the claim being reduced to a judgment. Because
of these obvious advantages, creditors frequently request the referees in
bankruptcy to grant the so-called "split" or "limited" discharge, and it is
apparently not unusual for them to comply." 8
The source of the bankruptcy court's authority to except a specific debt
from the general discharge is difficult to identify. Section 2(12) of the
act empowers these courts to "discharge or refuse to discharge bankrupts,"
and section 17a provides that "a discharge in bankruptcy shall release a
bankrupt from all of his provable debts" except types of obligations enum-
erated in the qualifying clauses of that section." 9 No power to make ex-
press exceptions of individual debts is specifically granted by the act,
120
and in a few cases bankruptcy courts have held that they have no such
authority because the dischargeability of a particular debt "is a matter for
another court to determine when and if steps are taken by the particular
creditor to enforce the claim under consideration."' 12
118. See Twinem, supra note 108: "Quite a number of Referees have already fol-
lowed the practice of declaring a particular obligation non-dischargeable." See Hamby
v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 217 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1954), and other cases cited
in notes 120, 123-132 infra.
One situation in which the bankruptcy courts are inclined to make express excep-
tions of certain debts in a general discharge is that in which the debtor has been
adjudicated a bankrupt in former proceedings and for some reason was not granted
a discharge then. The debts which were provable in the previous proceeding are not
released by a discharge granted in a subsequent proceeding. COLLUm §§ 14.05, 17.06.
The obligees of these debts may have them expressly excepted from the operation of
the discharge granted in the second bankruptcy proceeding. In re Summer, 107 F.2d
396 (2d Cir. 1939). See Hisey v. Lewis-Gale Hosp., supra note 103, at 25; Oglebay,
Some Developments in Bankruptcy Law, 18 REF. J. 9, 10, 14 (1943).
119. BANKxir'rcy Fom 45, for the discharge of the bankrupt, is phrased in terms
similar to those of section 17a, but without a list of the exceptions to the operation
of the discharge.
120. See In re Tamburo, 82 F. Supp. 995, 997 (D. Md. 1949); In re Anthony,
supra note 74, at 312.
121. In re Lowe, 36 F. Supp. 772, 773 (W.D. Ky. 1941) (referee had complied
with creditor's request for an exception). See also In re McCarthy, 45 F. Supp. 323
(E.D.N.Y. 1942); In re Borek, 180 F. Supp. 567 (D.N.J. 1960); taNirNGToN § 3234.
In the Borek case the referee not only ruled that the creditor's claim was non-dis-
chargeable, but also entered a judgment on it. When the creditor subsequently applied
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However, the greater number of courts which have passed on the ques-
tion have concluded that the bankruptcy court does have power to grant
a limited discharge, though this is a discretionary matter in the court, and
the creditor has no right to such action. 22 As a basis for this power, some
of the courts have pointed to the Hunt case. Thus, in Harrison v. Donnelly,
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit declared: "[S]ince the decision
of the Supreme Court in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt... the jurisdiction of a
bankruptcy court to limit the effect of its own order of discharge is no
longer questioned. But the court is not bound to exercise such jurisdiction
and does not do so under usual circumstances. '"u2
Of course the decision in the Hunt case that the bankruptcy court, in
order to protect the bankrupt, may entertain an ancillary bill in equity to
enjoin the enforcement of a dischargeable debt by a creditor does not
necessarily authorize such court to declare, at the creditor's request, that a
particular debt is not affected by the general discharge being granted to
the bankrupt."A
Those courts which take the trouble to try to explain the basis for their
power to grant limited discharges concede that it "must be gathered from
the implications of the [Bankruptcy] Act."25 And these implications have
been found in the general authority of the bankruptcy court to determine
the proper construction and application of that statute or of the effect of
the court's orders entered in a bankruptcy proceeding, 26 or in the "inherent
equity jurisdiction to control the effect of its own order of discharge...."127
The most recent explanation offered by a court of appeals is a simple dec-
laration that "the bankruptcy court was clothed with inherent equity juris-
diction to determine that question [dischargeability of a debt] and mold
its order of discharge accordingly."'1
It is generally agreed that this discretionary power should not be exercised
in the ordinary case, but only where, due to some unusual circumstances,
for an execution on the judgment, the bankruptcy court held the judgment to be void
as beyond the jurisdiction of the referee to enter, and ordered it stricken from the
record. The court recognized that it had power to hold a debt to be dischargeable,
but limited this jurisdiction to cases in which the debtor was seeking relief because his
remedy in the state courts would not adequately protect him.
122. See cases cited in notes 123-39 infra. See also, Hamby v. St. Paul Mercury
Indem. Co., supra note 118.
123. 153 F.2d 588, 589-90 (5th Cir. 1946). See also In re Zitzman, 46 F. Supp.
314 (E.D.N.Y. 1942). See Note, 28 VA. L. Rrv. 650 (1942).
124. In re Barber, supra note 74, at 728 observed that the question of the bankruptcy
court's duty to declare a debt non-dischargeable at the creditor's request "was not
even inferentially involved" in the Hunt decision. See Personal Fin. Co. v. Hadden, 142
F.2d 896, 879 (6th Cir. 1944).
125. In re Anthony, supra note 74, at 314.
126. In re Anthony, supra note 74, at 315. See Hisey v. Lewis-Gale Hosp., supra
note 103, at 25.
127. In re Tamburo, supra note 120, at 998.
128. Haerynck v. Thompson, 228 F.2d 72, 74 (10th Cir. 1955).
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a failure to do so will result in "embarrassment" or "unfairness" to either
the bankrupt or the creditor, 29 or where exercise of the power is needed
to achieve the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act or to "do equity" in the
bankruptcy proceeding.130 However, in the relatively few cases found in
which a limited discharge has been approved by the courts, the opinions
usually fail to indicate what special conditions existed to create a need for
this extraordinary action.131 One court specified that there was need to
protect a creditor of the bankrupt "from unnecessary, harassing and ex-
pensive duplication of litigation,"132 while another justified the limited
discharge procedure as one which is "convenient, [and] which works no
hardship on either the bankrupt or the creditor .... "13
In cases in which the courts refuse to except a specific debt from the
discharge though recognizing their authority to do so, the opinions uni-
formly point out that the creditor may protect his rights adequately by
pursuing the ordinary procedures of opposing the issuance of any discharge
to the bankrupt or of suing on the debt in a state court and there proving
his debt to be nondischargeable. 1' These courses of action being effective
to prevent the debt from becoming barred by the debtor's bankruptcy,
the circumstances do not require extraordinary measures. Furthermore, it
is often noted that the basic purposes of the Bankruptcy Act will not be
served, and may even be hindered, by the bankruptcy court's following a
practice of granting limited discharges. Certainly the release of the debtor
from the burden of his debts will not be facilitated;13 nor will the aim of
achieving an equitable distribution of the debtor's assets among all of the
creditors be furthered by the court's declaration that certain debts are
nondischargeable. 136 Instead, the speedy and efficient consummation of
the bankruptcy proceedings would be hampered if the court were to take
time to pass on the dischargeability of various claims before granting a
129. Harrison v. Donnelly, supra note 123, at 590; In re Tamburo, supra note 120, at
998.
130. In re Anthony, 42 F. Supp. 312, 315 (E.D. Ill. 1941).
131. No such reasons are set out in: Harrison v. Donnelly, supra note 123; Rees v.
Jensen, 170 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948); Haerynck v. Thompson, supra note 128; In re
Zitzmann, supra note 123; In re Wernecke, 1 F. Supp. 127 (W.D.N.Y. 1932). In the
Haerynck case, the bankrupt requested the referee to declare a specific creditor's claim
discharged, but the referee found it to be non-dischargeable. The bankruptcy court
overruled the referee and granted a full discharge, but the court of appeals found that
the referee's appraisal of the debt was correct, and therefore reversed the discharge
order "insofar as it discharged the bankrupt from liability upon the judgment" in
question.
132. In re Tamburo, supra note 120, at 1001.
133. See Hisey v. Lewis-Gale Hosp., supra note 103, at 25.
134. See cases cited in note 120 supra and note 138 infra. Also In re Sutton, 19
F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
135. In re Anthony, supra note 130.
136. In re Barber, 140 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1944); In re Anthony, supra note 130. See
In re Borek, supra note 121, at 571.
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discharge. The delay and expense involved in making these determinations
would operate to the detriment of the bankrupt and all of his other credi-
tors. 3 7 Other arguments against granting a creditor's request for an exemp-
tion from the discharge are that such procedure deprives the debtor of the
privilege of having a jury trial on the issue of the dischargeability of the
debt,138 and that declaring the debt exempt from the discharge does not
give the creditor a complete remedy, since he must still bring suit in an-
other court to obtain a judgment so that the obligation may be enforced.139
In this connection, it may be significant that in all six instances found in
which a limited discharge was ordered, the creditor petitioning to have his
debt exempted had already obtained a judgment in a state court; 40 in
cases denying the creditor's petition, no judgment on the debt had yet
been rendered.
IV. CONCLUSION
The early reaction to the Hunt case tended to be adverse to the idea that
the federal courts should be called upon to determine the dischargeability
of specific debts, and some prominent authorities predicted that the exercise
of this power would be confined to very narrow limits.14' This attitude was
probably engendered both by the desire to protect the jurisdiction of the
state courts and by the fear of overburdening the bankruptcy courts by the
addition of this function to their already heavy load. On the other hand,
there is obvious benefit in having the same court which issues the discharge
also determine the scope of its application, since this tribunal already has
assumed jurisdiction over the general matter of the debtor's obligation to
137. Watts v. Ellithorpe, 135 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1943); In re Biscoe, 45 F. Supp. 422
(D. Mass. 1952). In the case of In re Barber, supra note 136, it is further pointed
out that the whole effort of declaring a specific debt non-dischargeable may be a
waste because the bankrupt may subsequently be denied a discharge.
A contrary position is taken by Referee Coleman, A Plea for "One Stop Service" in
Bankruptcy, 25 REF. J. 31 (1951), who thinks that a reduction in the amount of
litigation would be achieved in sufficient measure to offset any disadvantages in this
procedure.
138. Watts v. Ellithorpe, supra note 137; In re Anthony, supra note 130; In re Bis-
coe, supra note 137.
139. In re Anthony, supra note 130. In re Borek, supra note 121.
140. The only opinions mentioning the matter of the evidence on which the dis-
chargeability of the debt is to be determined state that the bankruptcy court must act
on the basis of the record of the proceedings in the court in which the judgment was
rendered. Harrison v. Donnelly, supra note 123; In re Tamburo, supra note 120. See
Rees v. Jensen, supra note 131, at 350. However, it seems probable that the same
difference of opinion exists here as in the situation in which a state court is passing
on the character of a debt on which a judgment has already been obtained in prior
state proceedings. See the text discussion accompanying notes 28-36 supra.
141. Circuit Judge Swan in In re Devereaux, 76 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1935); Glenn,
Effect of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 30 VA. L. REV. 531 (1944); Oglebay, Some De-
velopments in Bankruptcy Law, 18 REF. J. 9, 13-14 (1943); Oglebay, Some Develop-
ments in Bankruptcy Law, 20 REF. J. 115 (1946).
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his creditors, has a background of information as to the debtor's situation
and often as to the nature of the creditor's claim, and is familiar with the
purposes and experienced in the operation of bankruptcy law. Further-
more, the interests of both the honest debtor and the honest creditor are
served by an expeditious determination of the question of the enforce-
ability of the bankrupts debts.
These advantages are substantial enough to have induced the bankruptcy
courts and referees to undertake this task often enough that the existence
of the power and the feasibility of its exercise in selected cases is no longer
open to serious doubt. There remains only the question of the extent to
which this jurisdiction will be invoked by both creditors and debtors.
The state courts will probably continue to handle the bulk of the litigation
regarding the dischargeability of specific debts, inasmuch as creditors ap-
pear generally to prefer to seek enforcement of their claims in the local
tribunals. However, it seems likely that the bankruptcy courts will gradu-
ally extend the exercise of their jurisdiction in this matter, first by more
freely granting the requests of debtors for injunctions against state court
proceedings to collect the debts claimed to be barred by the discharge, and
eventually by more frequently granting creditors' requests for the issuance
of split discharges. The process may well be accelerated by congressional
action amending the Bankruptcy Act to encourage or even require bank-
ruptcy courts to determine the effect of their own discharge orders. While
such a development may promote the purpose of the act to release the bank-
rupt from his debts, it may at the same time obstruct the purpose to secure
a prompt distribution of the bankrupts assets to his creditors, because the
time and attention of the bankruptcy courts will often be diverted from
distribution matters to discharge controversies.
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